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Channel systems for conducting monetary policy are becoming increasingly popular.
Several central banks already use a channel system, and others are using at least
some features of the channel system.1 Despite its popularity, the consequences of
implementing monetary policy with a channel system are not well understood. How
does implementation of monetary policy in a channel system diﬀer from plain-vanilla
open market operations? Given the use of a channel system, how should interest rates
be set to maximize welfare? The purpose of this paper is to study the theoretical
properties of a channel system.
In a channel system, a central bank oﬀers two standing facilities: a lending facility
where it is ready to supply money overnight at a given lending rate against collateral
and a deposit facility where banks can make overnight deposits to earn a deposit
rate. The interest-rate corridor is chosen to keep the overnight interest rate in the
money market close to the target rate. In a pure channel system, a change in policy
is implemented by simply changing the corridor without any open market operations.
There are several stylized facts of channel systems that a reasonable theoretical
model has to explain. First, all central banks set a strictly positive interest-rate spread
-d e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between the lending and the deposit rates. Second, central
banks typically react to changing economic conditions by increasing or decreasing
their interest-rate corridor without changing its spread. Third, the money market
rate tends to be in the middle of the corridor. We construct a general equilibrium
model that explains these stylized facts. Moreover, we shed some light on the following
questions. First, why do central banks choose diﬀerent corridors? Most central banks
choose a corridor of 50 basis points (e.g. Australia, Canada and New Zealand), while
1For example, versions of a channel system are operated by the Bank of Canada, Bank of England,
the European Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
The US Federal Reserve System recently modiﬁed the operating procedures of its discount window
facility in a way that it now shares elements of a standing facility. Prior to 2003, the discount
window rate was set below the target federal fund rate, but banks faced penalties when accessing
the discount window. In 2003, the Federal Reserve decided to set the discount window rate 100 basis
points above the target federal fund rate and eased access conditions to the discount window. The
resulting framework is similar to a channel system, where the deposit rate is zero and the lending
rate 100 basis point above the target rate.
2the European Central Bank’s (ECB) lending rate is 200 basis points higher than its
deposit rate (Figure 1).2 Second, why can some central banks control the overnight
interest rate very tightly while others cannot? For instance, the overnight interbank
cash rate in New Zealand is almost always on the policy rate set by the Reserve Bank
(Figure 2). In contrast, the uncollateralized Euro overnight rate and the short-term
collateralized Euro repo rate ﬂuctuate considerably aroundt h em i n i m u mb i dr a t es e t
by the ECB (Figure 1).
Figure 1:  Interest-rate channel of the European Central Bank
EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average) and Eurepo (reference rate for the Euro GC repo market)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































To study the stylized facts and questions, we construct a dynamic general equilib-
rium model of a channel system with a money market and a welfare-optimizing central
bank. Households are subject to idiosyncratic trading shocks which generate random
liquidity needs, where a positive liquidity shock for one household corresponds to a
negative liquidity shock for another household.3 T h es h o c k sc a nb ep a r t i a l l yi n s u r e d
2As can be seen from Figure 1, the ECB increased its spread dramatically from 50 basis points
to 250 basis points around February 1999 before reducing it to 200 basis points around April 1999.
3We abstract from modeling commercial banks explicitly. Rather, we assume that households
have direct access to the money market and the central bank’s lending and deposit facility. The
trading shocks are an approximation for liquidity shocks faced by commercial banks after trading in
the money market. Since there is no feasible trading of reserves after this market has closed, banks
which need liquidity have no choice but to use the standing facility oﬀered by the central bank.
3in a secured money market. To provide further insurance, the central bank operates a
standing facility where households can borrow or deposit money at the speciﬁed rates.
In accordance with central bank practice, there is no limit to the size of deposits on
which interest is paid, and there is no limit to the size of a loan that a household
can obtain provided that the loan is fully collateralized. Finally, the cost of pledging
collateral is explicit and money is essential.4
Within this framework we answer the following three questions. First, what is the
optimal interest-rate corridor? Second, what is the optimal collateral policy? Third,
how does a change of the corridor aﬀect the money market rate?
Figure 2: Interest-rate channel of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Overnight Interbank Cash Rate

























































































































































































































































































































T h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t se m e r g ef r o mo u rm o d e l .F i r s t ,i ti so p t i m a lt oh a v eap o s i t i v e
spread if the opportunity cost of holding collateral is positive.5 Second, the optimal
spread is decreasing in the rate of return of the collateral and equal to zero when
the opportunity cost of acquiring collateral is zero. Third, a central bank has two
4By ‘essential,’ we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota 1998
and Wallace 2001).
5The rate of return of the collateral determines the opportunity costs for commercial banks of
accessing the lending facility of the central bank where a high rate of return implies a small or zero
opportunity cost. Assets accepted as collateral are typically low-risk and low-yield assets such as
government securities.
4equivalent options for implementing a given policy: it can either shift the corridor
while keeping the interest-rate spread constant, or it can change the spread. For
instance, to change its policy, it can keep the deposit rate constant and only change
the borrowing rate as done, for example, by the US Federal Reserve System or it
can shift the corridor without changing its spread as done by the European Central
Bank. Fourth, we also ﬁnd that the money market rate is above the target rate if the
opportunity cost of holding collateral is positive.6
A very interesting aspect of the channel system is that a central bank can “tighten”
or “loosen” its policy without changing its target rate. The reason is that, by increas-
ing the spread of the corridor symmetrically around the target rate, the central bank
worsens the option for banks of accessing the standing facility. As a result, the pol-
icy regime is tighter.7 More generally, this result suggests that a characterization of
policy through an interest-rate rule, as it is commonly done in a large body of the lit-
erature, is incomplete. Rather, in a channel system, any policy must be characterized
t h r o u g ha ni n t e r e s t - r a t ecorridor rule. We provide more discussion on this result in
the literature section below.
Literature There are very few theoretical studies of channel systems, and all of
them are partial equilibrium models. An early contribution is the model of reserve
management under uncertainty by Poole (1968). Woodford (2000, 2001, 2003) dis-
cusses and analyses the channel system to address the question of how to conduct
monetary policy in a world with a vanishing stock of money. Whitesell (2006) evalu-
ates reserves regimes versus channel systems. Elements of channel systems have been
previously described in Gaspar, Quiros and Mendizabal (2004), Guthrie and Wright
(2000), and Heller and Lengwiler (2003).
It appears that there are two reasons why there is no other general equilibrium
analysis of a channel system. First, money growth is endogenous in such a system. In
6This property of the model provides a rationale for the observation that the collateralized Eurepo
rate tends to be above the minimum bid rate and very close to the uncollateralized EONIA rate
(Figure 1). Our model suggests that the ECB can get the money market rate closer to its minimum
bid rate if it allows for less costly collateral.
7This result suggests that the ECB with its 200-basis-points corridor implements a tighter mon-
etary policy than the other central banks operating a channel system mentioned before.
5contrast, most theoretical models of monetary policy characterize optimal policy in
terms of a path for the money supply. In practice, however, monetary policy involves
rules for setting nominal interest rates, and most central banks specify operating
targets for overnight interest rates.8 This paper, therefore, is an attempt to break the
apparent dichotomy (Goodhart, 1989) between theoretical analysis and central bank
practices.
The second reason is related to the widespread belief that modeling the details
of the framework used to implement a given interest-rate rule is unimportant when
analyzing optimal monetary policy. That is, it is taken for granted that the economic
consequences of interest-rate rules do not hinge on the speciﬁcd e t a i l so fm o n e t a r y
policy implementation. However, our general equilibrium analysis reveals that a char-
acterization of optimal policy and its implementation cannot be separated. To see
this, consider any interest-rate rule in a system with zero deposit rate as operated, for
example, by the US Federal Reserve System. Such an interest-rate rule uniquely de-
termines how “tight” or “loose” the policy is. In contrast, the same rule or any other
interest-rate rule has no meaning in a channel system since it does not determine
whether a policy is “tight” or “loose.” Consequently, in a channel system optimal
policy must not only state an interest-rate rule but it must state an interest-rate
corridor rule. This is a new insight, which goes beyond what we already know from
the large and growing body of literature on the optimal design of interest-rate rules.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. The
equilibrium without the money market and the optimal monetary policy are derived
in Section 3. The equilibrium with the money market is characterized in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the policy implications that arise from the model,
and Section 6 concludes. All proofs and a description of the Euro money markets and
the ECB’s operating procedures can be found in the Appendix.
8This fact is also emphasized in Woodford’s (2003) book at the beginning of Chapter 2: “While
virtually all central banks use short-term nominal interest rates (...) as their instrument (...), the
theoretical literature in monetary economics has concerned itself almost entirely with the analysis of
policies that are described by alternative (...) paths for the money supply. The aim of this chapter
is to remedy this oversight by presenting a theory of price-level determination under interest-rate
rules of the sort that are often taken to describe actual central-bank policies.”
62 Environment
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with a [0,1]-continuum of inﬁnitely-
lived agents and a central bank.9 Time is discrete, and in each period three perfectly
competitive markets open sequentially. The ﬁrst market is the settlement market,
where all agents produce and consume a general good and settle their claims from
t h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d .T h es e c o n dm a r k e ti st h em o n e ym a r k e t ,w h e r ea g e n t sc a nb o r -
row and lend cash at the market rate, and the third market is a goods market, where
agents either produce or consume a perishable good.
 
t  1 t +  
Settlement Market 
Produce and consume 
Idio. Shock     
Money Market 
interest  rate im  
Signal 
Goods Market 
Produce or consume 
 
Standing Facility 
deposit rate id  
lending rate il
Figure 3: Sequence of markets.
We now describe each market starting from the last one.
Goods market At the beginning of the third market, agents receive idiosyncratic
preference and technology shocks which determine whether they consume or produce
in this market. With probability 1−n an agent can consume and cannot produce: we
refer to these agents as buyers. With probability n,a na g e n tc a np r o d u c ea n dc a n n o t
consume: these are sellers. Agents get utility u(q) from q consumption in the third
market, where u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞ and u0(∞)=0 . Producers incur
a utility cost c(q)=q from producing q units of output. All trades are anonymous,
and agents’ trading histories are private information. Since sellers require immediate
9The environment combines elements of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Camera and
Waller (2006). The Lagos-Wright framework provides a microfoundation for money demand while
keeping the distribution of money balances analytically tractable. Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2006) introduce ﬁnancial intermediation into the Lagos-Wright framework. The sequence of markets
is motivated by the ECB’s operating procedures. In the Appendix, we describe the functioning of
the Euro money markets and the ECB’s operating procedures.
7compensation for their production eﬀort, money is essential for trade. The discount
factor is β where for technical reasons we assume that β>n .
Money market At the beginning of the second market, agents receive a signal
about the probability that they will become a consumer or a producer in the goods
market. With probability σk, an agent receives the information that he will be a
seller with probability nk, k = H,L,w h e r eε ≡ nH − nL ∈ [0,1]. W ea s s u m et h a t
n =
P
k=H,Lσknk so that there is no aggregate uncertainty. This modeling approach
captures the idea that, when the money market is open, agents receive information
about their end-of-day cash holdings. Some agents believe that they are likely to have
excess cash at the end of the day, and others that they are likely to be short of cash.
The diﬀerence in expected liquidity needs generates an incentive for trading in the
money market.
There are three cases. If ε =0 , the signal contains no information and so agents
have no gains from trading in the money market.10 Consequently, no trade occurs
in the money market. If ε =1 , there is no uncertainty about the liquidity shock in
the goods market. Consequently, the portfolios are completely adjusted in the money
market and no agent accesses the standing facility. Finally, if ε ∈ (0,1), the signal
contains some information about the future liquidity shock, but the information is
not perfect. As a result, agents use both the money market and the standing facility
to adjust their portfolio. For example, some agents will get the information that they
will be sellers with high probability but then turn out to be buyers. These agents
will ﬁrst use the money market to trade away their cash and then use the standing
facility to take out loans.
Settlement market In the ﬁrst market, agents produce and consume general
goods, repay loans, redeem deposits and adjust their money balances. General goods
are produced solely from inputs of labor according to a constant return to scale pro-
duction technology where one unit of the consumption good is produced with one
10Here, we already take into account that in equilibrium all agents leave the settlement stage
with the same amounts of money and bonds (see the analysis in Section 3.1). Consequently, in
equilibrium all agents are identical at the beginning of the money market. Thus, when ε =0they
remain identical and so there are no gains from trading in the money market.
8unit of labor generating one unit of disutility. Thus, producing h units of the general
good implies disutility −h, while consuming h units gives utility h.T h e p u r p o s e
of this market is that agents can settle their debt. A convenient feature of these
assumptions about preferences and technology is that they keep the distribution of
money balances analytically tractable as in Lagos and Wright (2005).11 As we will
see below, in equilibrium all households will hold the same amounts of money and
collateral when they move on to the money market.12
2.1 Standing facility
We assume that at the beginning of the third market, after the idiosyncratic shocks
are observed, a central bank oﬀers a borrowing facility and a deposit facility. The
central bank operates at zero cost and oﬀers nominal loans   at an interest rate i  and
promises to pay interest rate id on nominal deposits d with i  ≥ id.T h i s c o n d i t i o n
eliminates the possibility for arbitrage where agents borrow and subsequently make
a deposit at interest id >i  , thus increasing their money holdings at no cost.
Since we focus on standing facilities, we restrict ﬁnancial contracts to overnight
contracts. An agent who borrows   units of money from the central bank in market
3, repays (1 + i )  units of money in market 1 of the following period. Also, an agent
who deposits d units of money at the central bank in market 3 of period t receives
(1 + id)d units of money in market 1 of the following period.
Collateral In any model of credit, default is a serious issue. Since production is
costly, those agents who have borrowed in the previous period have an incentive to
default in market 1 of the current period. To prevent default, all loans must be
secured with collateral. We assume that general goods produced in market 1 can be
stored and used as collateral. The storage technology has constant return to scale and
yields R ≥ 1 units of general goods in market 1 of the following period. We impose
βR ≤ 1, since when βR > 1, agents would store inﬁnite amounts of goods which is
11As in Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2006) the linearity of consumption utility and the lin-
earity of production disutility implies that no welfare is generated.
12An alternative framework that would also generate a degenerated distribution of asset holdings
is the large household framework of Shi (1997).
9inconsistent with equilibrium.
The central bank operates the money market and keeps track of all ﬁnancial
arrangements and collateral holdings. In particular, only the central bank can verify
the existence of collateral. This means that collateral cannot be used to secure trade
credit between a seller and a buyer in the goods market.
Monetary policy Deﬁne δ ≡ i  − id and note that the central bank can change
policy in two ways. It can either increase or decrease δ, holding the policy rate (or
target rate ) ip =( i  + id)/2 constant, or it can change ip while holding δ constant.
In a channel system, the money stock evolves endogenously as follows
M+1 = M − i L + idD + πM (1)
where M denotes the per capita stock of money at the beginning of period t.I nt h e
ﬁrst market, total loans L are repaid. Since interest-rate payments by the agents are
i L, the stock of money shrinks by this amount. Interest payments by the central
bank on total deposits are idD. The central bank simply prints additional money
to make these interest payments so the stock of money increases by this amount.
Finally, the central bank can also change the stock of money via lump-sum transfers
T = πM in market 1. However, since central banks cannot tax agents, we restrict
these lump-sum transfers to be positive, that is π ≥ 0.13
2.2 First-best allocation
In the Appendix, we show that the expected lifetime utility of the representative agent
for a stationary allocation (q,b),w h e r eq is consumption and b collateral holdings at
the beginning of a period, is given by
(1 − β)W =( 1− n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b. (2)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the equation is the expected utility from
consuming and producing the market 3 good. The second term is the utility of
13The lump-sum transfers are a substitute for open-market operations that we do not model here.
However, in pure channel systems central banks do not use open-market operations to aﬀect the
money market rate on a regular basis. Nevertheless, there is no clear reason why we should rule this
possibility out. Later we will show that it is optimal to set π =0 .
10producing collateral and receiving the return in the following period.
It is obvious that the ﬁrst-best allocation (q∗,b ∗) satisﬁes q = q∗,w h e r eq∗ is the
value of q that solves u0(q)=1 .M o r e o v e r ,b∗ =0if βR < 1 and b∗ is indeterminate
if βR =1 . Thus, a social planner would never choose a positive amount of collateral
when collateral is costly.
3 No trade in the money market
In this section, to focus on the stabding facility, we consider the case, where the signal
contains no information, i.e., ε =0 . In this case, agents have no gains from trading in
the money market. Consequently, no trade occurs in the money market, and agents
only use the lending and deposit facilities of the central bank to adjust their money
holdings. We will consider the case ε ∈ (0,1) in Section 4.
In period t,l e tφ ≡ 1/P be the real price of money in market 1, where P is
the price of goods in market 1. We focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria,
where all agents follow identical strategies and where the real allocation is constant
over time. In a stationary equilibrium, beginning-of-period real money balances are
time-invariant
φM = φ+1M+1. (3)
This implies that φ/φ+1 = P+1/P = M+1/M is constant. Denote γ ≡ M+1/M the
time-invariant (endogenous) growth rate of the money supply.
We let V (m,b) denote the expected value from entering market 2 with m units of
money and b collateral. W(m,b, ,d) denotes the expected value of entering the ﬁrst
market with m units of money, b collateral,   loans, and d deposits. For notational
simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the value function on the time index t.
In what follows, we look at a representative period t.
3.1 Settlement
In the ﬁrst market, the problem of a representative agent is:
W(m,b, ,d)= m a x
h,m2,b2
−h + V (m2,b 2)
s.t. φm2 + b2 = h + φm + Rb + φ(1 + id)d − φ(1 + i )  + φπM.
11where h is hours worked in market 1, m2 is the amount of money brought in to the
second market, and b2 is the amount of collateral brought in to the second market.
Using the budget constraint to eliminate h in the objective function, one obtains the
ﬁrst-order conditions14
Vm ≤ φ ( = if m>0 )( 4 )
Vb ≤ 1 ( = if b>0 )( 5 )
Vm ≡
∂V(m2,b2)
∂m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the
second market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, −φ is the
utility cost of acquiring one unit of money in the ﬁr s tm a r k e to fpe r i odt. Vb ≡
∂V(m2,b2)
∂b2
is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the second market in period
t. Since the marginal disutility of working is 1, −1 is the utility cost of acquiring one
unit of collateral in the ﬁr s tm a r k e to fp e r i o dt. The implication of (4) and (5) is that
all agents enter the following period with the same amount of money and the same
quantity of collateral (which can be zero). This is the reason why we interpret this
market as a settlement stage. By itself, this market does not increase social welfare.
Rather, it involves a mere transfer of an asset between participants in order to settle
claims from the previous period.
T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sa r e
Wm = φ;Wb = R;W  = −φ(1 + i );Wd = φ(1 + id) (6)
where Wj is the partial derivative of W(m,b, ,d) with respect to j = m,b, ,d.
3.2 Liquidity shocks
We immediately proceed to market 3 since, when ε =0 , no trade occurs in the
money market. At the beginning of market 3, agents receive idiosyncratic shocks
which determine whether they are consumers or producers. With probability 1 − n,
an agent becomes a consumer, and, with probability n,ap r o d u c e r . L e tq and qs
respectively denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller
in market 3.L e t  b ( s)a n ddb (ds) respectively denote the loan obtained and the
14Throughout the paper, we focus on monetary equilibria, m>0, where (4) holds with equality.
12amount of money deposited by a buyer (seller) in market 3. An agent who has m
money and b collateral at the opening of market 3 has expected lifetime utility
V (m,b)=( 1 − n)[u(q)+βW(m − pq − db +  b,b,  b,d b)]
+n[−qs + βW(m + pqs − ds +  s,b,  s,d s)]
where q,qs,  s,  b,d s and db are chosen optimally as follows.
It is obvious that buyers will never deposit funds in the central bank and sellers
will never take out loans and therefore db =0and  s =0 . For the rest of the paper,
to simplify notation, let   ≡  b and d ≡ ds. Accordingly, we get
V (m,b)=( 1 − n)[u(q)+βW(m − pq +  ,b, ,0)]
+n[−qs + βW (m + pqs − d,b,0,d)]
where qs, q,  and d solve the following optimization problems.
A seller’s problem is maxqs,d [−qs + βW (m + pqs − d,b,0,d)] s.t. m+pqs−d ≥ 0.15
Using (6), the ﬁrst-order condition reduces to
pβφ+1 + pβφ+1λd =1 (7)
id = λd (8)
where βφ+1λd is the multiplier on the deposit constraint. The two conditions can be
combined to get
pβφ+1 (1 + id)=1 . (9)
If an agent is a buyer, he solves the following maximization problem:
max
q, 
u(q)+βW(m − pq +  ,b, ,0)
s.t. pq ≤ m +   and   ≤ ¯  
where
¯   ≡ Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i )
¤
. (10)
15Here, we assume that sellers can deposit their money holdings at the standing facility, including
the proceeds from their latest transaction. This is in line with the institutional details described
in the Appendix that banks can access the standing facility of the ECB 30 minutes after the close
of the money market. The results are not fundamentally aﬀected when agents can only deposit a
fraction or none of their receipts from selling goods.
13is the maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the central bank since b units
of collateral transform into Rb units of real goods at the beginning of the following
period. These goods can be sold for Rb/φ+1 units of money. Finally, the collateral
must also cover the interest payment.
Using (6), the buyer’s ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as
u
0(q)=pβφ+1(1 + λq) (11)
λq = λ  + i  (12)
where βφ+1λq is the multiplier of the buyer’s budget constraint and βφ+1λ  the mul-
tiplier of the borrowing constraint. Using (9) and combining (11) and (12) yields
u
0(q)=
1+i  + λ 
1+id
. (13)
If the borrowing constraint is not binding, and the central bank sets i  = id,t r a d e s
are eﬃcient. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1,w h i c hm e a n s
trades are ineﬃcient even when i  = id.
Using the envelope theorem and (11), the marginal value of money in market 3 is
Vm =( 1− n)u
0(q)/p + nβφ+1(1 + id). (14)
The marginal value of money has a straightforward interpretation. An agent with an
additional unit of money becomes a buyer with probability 1 − n, in which case he
acquires 1/p units of goods yielding additional utility u0(q)/p. With probability n,h e
becomes a seller, in which case he deposits his money overnight, yielding the nominal
return 1+id. Note that the standing facility increases the marginal value of money
because agents can earn interest on idle cash.
3.3 Liquidity premium
Since in equilibrium there is no default, the real return of collateral is βR.T h er e a l
return, βR, is smaller than the marginal value, Vb,i fλ  > 0. To see this, use the
envelope theorem to derive the marginal value of collateral in the third market
Vb =( 1− n)λ βR/(1 + i )+βR. (15)
14Thus, the diﬀerence between the real return and the marginal value is (1−n)λ βR/(1 + i ).
This quantity is positive if collateral relaxes the borrowing constraints of the buyers;
i.e., if λ  > 0.I ti sc r i t i c a lf o rt h ew o r k i n go ft h em o d e lt h a tVb >β R .T h er e a s o ni s
that, since βR−1 is negative, agents are only willing to hold collateral if its liquidity
value as expressed by the shadow price λ  is positive.
To derive the liquidity premium on the collateral, use the ﬁrst-order conditions
(5) and (13) to write (15) as follows:
1 − βR =( 1− n)[u
0(q)βR/∆ − βR] (16)
where ∆ ≡ (1+i )/(1+id). The term βR/∆ is the price of goods in terms of collateral
in market 3. A buyer can use the collateral to borrow R
φ+1(1+i ) units of money which
allows him to acquire R
pφ+1(1+i ) =
βR(1+id)
1+i  = βR/∆ units of goods.
The right-hand side of equation (16) is the collateral’s liquidity premium. While
collateral costs −1 to produce, its return is βR ≤ 1. Hence, if βR < 1, agents need
an incentive to hold collateral. This is provided by making collateral liquid.16
3.4 Symmetric stationary equilibrium




≥ (1 − n)[u
0(q)/∆ − 1] ( = if b>0 ). (17)
Then (4), (9), (14), and taking into account that in a stationary equilibrium M+1/M =
φ/φ+1 = γ, yield
γ − β (1 + id)
β (1 + id)
=( 1− n)[u
0(q) − 1]. (18)
A l s o ,f r o m( 1 ) ,s i n c eL =( 1− n)  and D = nd,w eg e t




where zm ≡ m/p and z  ≡  /p. To derive this equation, we use d = m + pqs,m a r k e t
clearing nqs =( 1− n)q, and we take into account that in symmetric equilibrium all
16In these type of model, liquidity premia arise naturally. See, for example, Lagos (2005), Lester,
Postlewaite and Wright (2006), Telyukova and Wright (2006) or Berentsen and Waller (2006).
15agents hold identical amounts of money when they enter market 3. Then, from the
budget constraint of the buyer, we have
q = zm + z . (20)
Finally, since βR < 1 in any equilibrium where agents hold collateral, it must be the
case that the borrowing constraint is binding and so from (9) and (10) we get17
z  = βRb/∆. (21)
We can use these ﬁve equations to deﬁne a symmetric stationary equilibrium. They
determine the endogenous variables (γ,q,z ,z m,b). Note that all other endogenous
variables can be derived from these equilibrium values.
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a policy (id,i  ,π) and a time-
invariant list (γ,q,z ,z m,b) satisfying (17)-(21) with z  ≥ 0 and zm ≥ 0.
Let
˜ ∆ ≡
1 − βn+ π/(1 + id)
1/R − nβ
. (22)
Then we have the following:
Proposition 1 For any (id,i  ,π) with i  ≥ id ≥ 0, there exists a unique symmetric
stationary equilibrium such that
z  > 0 and zm =0 if and only if ∆ =1
z  > 0 and zm > 0 if and only if 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆
z  =0and zm > 0 if and only if ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.
Several points are worth mentioning. First, the critical element to verify in the
proof is under which condition agents acquire collateral. They are willing to borrow at
the standing facility if the borrowing rate is not too high; i.e., if ∆ < ˜ ∆. Second, the
critical value ˜ ∆ is increasing in R and π,a n ds oi sb. Agents increase their collateral
17If the borrowing constraint is non-binding (λ  =0 ), equation (15) reduces to Vb = βR, implying
from (5) that b =0since we have βR < 1. Consequently, in any equilibrium where agents hold
collateral, it must be the case that the constraint is binding (λ  > 0)a n ds o  = ¯   = Rb/
£






φ+1 (1 + i)
¤
.
16holdings and hence ﬁnance a larger share of their consumption by borrowing if R
or π are increased. Third, if ∆ =1 , agents are not willing to hold money across
periods. They just use collateral to borrow money to ﬁnance their consumption.
This, however, does not mean that money is not used since it still plays the role of a
medium of exchange in market 3. It only means that agents do not want to hold it
across periods.
Given a real allocation (q(∆),b(∆)) any pair (i ,i d) satisfying ∆ =
1+i 
1+id is con-
sistent with this allocation. Thus, there are many ways to implement a given policy
∆. The allocations only diﬀer in the rate of inﬂation. This can be seen from (19)
which can be written as follows
γ − π
1+id




Since the right-hand side of the equation is a constant for a given ∆,t h ei n ﬂation
rate γ − 1 is increasing in id.T o k e e p ∆ constant when increasing id, one needs to
increase i  accordingly.
3.5 Optimal policy
We now derive the optimal policy. The central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected lifetime utility of the representative agent. It does so by choosing lump-sum
transfers π,c o n s u m p t i o nq and collateral holding b to maximize (2) subject to the
constraint that its choice is consistent with the allocation given by (17)-(20). Given
π, the policy is implemented by choosing ∆.
Assume ﬁr s tt h a ti ti so p t i m a lt os e t∆ ≥ ˜ ∆. In this case, no agent is borrowing









Note that ˜ q is independent of ∆ when ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆ and so any ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆,i m p l e m e n t st h e
same real allocation (b,q)=( 0 , ˜ q).
Now consider the largest q that the central bank can implement. From (17) the
largest q is attained when ∆ =1 .I ts a t i s ﬁes







17Thus, the policy ∆ =1attains the allocation (b,q)=( ˆ q/(βR), ˆ q) since no agent
is holding money across the period when ∆ =1 . Accordingly, the central bank is
constrained to choose quantities q such that ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q(π).




=( 1 − n)[u
0(q)/∆ − 1] (23)







(1 − n)(∆ − 1)
1+βn(∆ − 1) − ∆/R + π/(1 + id)
¸
.
Thus, the central bank is constrained to choose an allocation that satisﬁes (23) and
(24), and so the central bank’s maximization problem is
max
q,b,π
(1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( βR− 1)b







and ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q(π)
where to derive (25), we use (23) to replace ∆ in (24).
Proposition 2 π =0is optimal. Also, there exists a critical value R such that if




The striking result of Proposition 2 is that it is never optimal to set a zero interest-
rate band δ = i −id since ∆ > 1. The reason is that, for society, the use of collateral
is costly, since βR−1 is negative. The beneﬁti st h a ti ti n c r e a s e sc o n s u m p t i o na b o v e
q =˜ q. The central bank thus faces a trade-oﬀ. It can encourage the use of costly
collateral to increase consumption. The optimal policy simply equates the marginal
beneﬁt of additional consumption to the marginal cost of holding collateral. It is
interesting to note that, in contrast to collateral, the use of ﬁat money is not costly
for society since money can be produced without cost.
18If R is small (R<R), it is optimal for the central bank to discourage the use of
collateral.18 It does so by implementing an interest-rate policy that satisﬁes ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.





agents ﬁnance some of their consumption through borrowing at the standing facility.
An increase in R reduces the optimal ∆. In the limit, as R → 1/β, the holding
of collateral becomes costless. We consider the optimal policy in this limiting case
below.
An interesting aspect of Proposition 2 is that it is optimal to set π =0 .T os e e
why, note that ˆ q is independent of π,a n d˜ q is decreasing in π. Therefore, increasing
π increases the set of attainable allocations, but only by decreasing the lower bound
of the feasible q’s. Then, since F is decreasing in π,a ni n c r e a s ei nπ either increases
b, decreases q or both. This reduces welfare unambiguously. Hence, it is optimal to
set π to zero. The intuition is that an increase in π is equivalent to an increase in
inﬂation. The inﬂation tax reduces the sellers willingness to produce for money and
so agents agents substitute bonds for money.
These results are intuitive. The optimal monetary policy trades oﬀ the cost of
holding collateral and the consumption ﬂow from borrowing at the facility. When
collateral is costly to hold, the central bank wants to discourage its use. This is
achieved by increasing the cost of transforming collateral into money; that is by in-
creasing the interest-rate corridor. By modifying the liquidity properties of collateral,
monetary policy aﬀects the portfolio decision of agents and, as a consequence, the
real allocation.
Costless collateral Holding collateral is costless when R =1 /β since the cost of
acquiring one unit is equal to the discounted return βR. To avoid indeterminacies
of the equilibrium allocation, we consider the limiting allocation when the rate of
return of the collateral satisﬁes R → 1/β.19 In this limiting case, the critical value
18This is similar as in Lagos and Rocheteau (2004), albeit in a very diﬀerent context. They
construct a model where capital competes with ﬁat money as a medium of exchange. They show
that when the socially eﬃcient stock of capital is low (which is the case when the rate of return is
low) a monetary equilibrium exists that dominates the non-monetary one in terms of welfare. So in
this case, it would be optimal to discourage the use of capital as a medium of exchange.
19We consider the limiting allocation since at R =1 /β agents are indiﬀerent to how much collateral
they acquire even if they plan not to use it to obtain goods. If λ  > 0, agents are strictly better oﬀ
19is ˜ ∆ =
1−βn
β−βn > 1 and Proposition 1 continues to hold. We deﬁne the allocation that
is attained under the optimal policy as the limiting allocation that is attained when
i  → id.W eﬁnd the following results.
Proposition 3 With costless collateral, the optimal policy i  → id implements the
ﬁrst-best allocation q∗. The price level approaches inﬁnity.
The proof of the ﬁrst part is an immediate consequence of equation (17) which
implies that limβR→1 u0 (q)=∆.S i n c et h eﬁrst-best allocation requires that u0 (q)=1 ,
the result is established.
To understand why the price level approaches inﬁnity under the optimal policy,
note that if i  = id > 0, then money is strictly dominated in return by collateral.
The reason is that the collateral can costlessly be transformed into money and so any
consumption level that can be achieved with money can be achieved with collateral
at no additional cost. However, the collateral has the intrinsic return βR =1while
t h er e t u r no nm o n e yi s
β
γ < 1.20 Consequently, the demand for money approaches
zero. To encourage agents to hold the stock of money, its price must approach zero.
This immediately implies that p → +∞, and therefore zm = M+1/p → 0.O n l ya tt h e
Friedman rule i  = id =0are the returns equal and so agents are indiﬀerent between
holding money, collateral or both.
4 Trade in the money market
We now assume that ε>0. Recall that at the beginning of the money market, agents
receive a signal about the probability that they will become a consumer or a producer
in the third market. With probability σk, an agent receives the information that he
will be a seller with probability nk, k = H,L.
We focus on the case where ε = nH −nL is small. This case captures the situation
where agents’ liquidity needs in the money market are not too diﬀerent from each
other and not too diﬀerent from their initial beliefs. In this case, they are reluctant
by increasing their collateral holdings up to the amount where λ  =0 . However, they are indiﬀerent
between any amount of collateral that yields λ  =0 . In the limiting allocation attained when
R → 1/β, agents acquire the smallest amount consistent with λ  =0 .
20This follows from (18) together with u0(q)=∆.
20to pledge all their collateral or to sell all their money holdings in the money market.
Consequently, the short-selling constraints in the money market are nonbinding. This
essentially means that the money market rate remains strictly within the interest-
rate corridor, which is consistent with the experience of central banks that operate a
channel system (see Figure 1 and 2).
In what follows, we look at a representative period t. Also, we assume the central
bank does not make lump-sum transfers (π =0 ) since we have shown that this is
optimal.
Settlement We let W(m,b, ,d,y) denote the expected value of entering the ﬁrst
market with m units of money, b collateral,   loans, d deposits, and private credit y,
where y>0 means that the agent has borrowed money in the money market of the
previous period. Z(m,b) denotes the expected value from entering the money market
with m units of money and b collateral.
In the ﬁrst market, the problem of a representative agent is:
W(m,b, ,d,y)= m a x
h,m2,b2
−h + Z (m2,b 2)
s.t. φm2 + b2 = h + φm + Rb + φ(1 + id)d − φ(1 + i )  − φ(1 + im)y
where h is hours worked in market 1. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
Zm = φ (26)
Zb ≤ 1 ( = if b>0 ). (27)
Zm ≡
∂Z(m2,b2)
∂m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money and
Zb ≡
∂Z(m2,b2)
∂b2 is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the money
market in period t. The envelope conditions are (6) and
Wy = −φ(1 + im) (28)
where Wy is the partial derivative of W(m,b, ,d,y) with respect to y.
Money market Let yk, k = L,H, be the amount of money acquired in the money
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k ≥ 0.












m  is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint in the money market
and φ+1βλ
k
md is the multiplier on the lending constraint. Note that, since in any
equilibrium those agents who are likely to become sellers do not borrow money, and
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Thus, the marginal value of money at the beginning of the money market is equal
to the expected value of using the money to buy goods in market 3, σLV L
m,p l u st h e
expected value of lending it in the money market, −σHV H
y .





k =0 . (34)
22Goods market At the beginning of market 3, an agent’s state is revealed. Consider
an agent of type k who received the signal that he will be a buyer with probability
1 − nk and a producer with probability nk.L e t qk and qk
s respectively denote the





s) respectively denote the loan obtained from the central bank and the
amount of money deposited at the central bank by this agent in this market. If this
agent holds m money, b collateral and private debt y at the opening of this market,
he has expected lifetime utility
V
k(m,b,y)=( 1 − n
k)[u(q
k)+βW(m − pq
















b are chosen optimally as described in Section 3. The
only diﬀerence is that the constraints in the goods market now take into account an
agent’s borrowing or lending yk in the money market as follows
 
k ≤ ¯  
k ≡ Rb/
£





k ≤ m +  
k (36)
d
k ≤ m (37)
where ˆ ∆ ≡
1+i 
1+im.T h e q u a n t i t y ¯  k is still the maximal amount that a buyer can









, it is increased accordingly.
Endogenous money supply Finally, we need to adjust equation (1) to take into
account how the money market aﬀects the evolution of the stock of money across
periods. The new equation is























where  k = Rb/
£
φ+1 (1 + i )
¤
− yk/ˆ ∆ and dk = M + yk + pqk
s.U s i n g t h e m a r k e t
clearing conditions in the goods and money markets, we can write this equation as
follows











23It is interesting to compare (39) with (19) (when π =0 ). As before, the entire
stock of money earns interest id.T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence is the amount of loans that the
central bank provides. Without the money market, the amount is (1 − n) /M;w i t h
a money market, it is σL(1 − nL) L/M + σH(1 − nH) H/M.
4.1 Symmetric stationary equilibrium
We again focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria, where all agents follow iden-
tical strategies and where the real allocation is constant over time. Furthermore, we
focus on equilibria, where the short-selling constraints in the money market are non-
binding. This essentially means that the money market rate remains strictly within
the interest-rate corridor, which is consistent with the experience of central banks
t h a to p e r a t eac h a n n e ls y s t e m( s e eF i g u r e1a n d2 ) .
In the Appendix we prove:
Lemma 4 A symmetric stationary equilibrium where no short-selling constraint is
binding in the money market is a time-invariant list
³
ˆ ∆,q L,qH,zL,zH,z m,b,γ
´
and
ap o l i c y(id,i  ) satisfying























´ {(ˆ ∆−1)[σL(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−εσLσH(qL−qH)ˆ ∆}R(∆−1)
Rˆ ∆−∆+(1−n)Rˆ ∆(∆−1) (43)







nβR ,k = H,L, (45)
with b ≥ 0, zL <β R bˆ ∆/∆ and zH > −zm.
We discuss the policy implications of Lemma 4 in Section 5.
Proposition 5 For any 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆, there exists a critical value ε1 > 0,d e ﬁned in
the proof, such that, if ε<ε 1, a symmetric monetary equilibrium exists where no
short-selling constraint in the money market binds.
24Note ﬁrst that the system of equations (40) - (45) can be solved recursively. Equa-




from the remaining equations. One then has to check that the re-
quired inequalities hold. The inequality b ≥ 0 simply requires that policy is such
that agents have an incentive to acquire collateral which is satisﬁed whenever ∆ < ˜ ∆
(deﬁned by (22)). The inequality zL <β R bˆ ∆/∆ requires that those agents who are
likely to become buyers are not pledging all their collateral to acquire money in the
money market, and the inequality zH > −zm requires that those agents who are likely
to become sellers are not selling all their money.
5 Discussion of the policy implications
We now discuss the key implications of our model for the behavior of the money
market rate, inﬂation, liquidity, collateral requirement, and the use of interest-rate
rules to study monetary policy. These results can be found by inspecting equations
(40) and (44). For this discussion, let us deﬁne the policy interest rate ip ≡ (i +id)/2.
Money market rate I nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,w eh a v es e e nt h a tt h em o n e ym a r k e t
rate tends to be in the middle or above the target rate, and changes one-to-one with
a shift in the corridor (see also Figures 1 and 2). Our model replicates these facts.
To see this, we can write (44) as follows
im = i  − nβRδ. (46)
where δ = i  − id. Inspection of (46) reveals the following result: First, if the spread
δ is kept constant, im changes in i  one-to-one. Second, if nβR =1 /2,t h e nim = ip.21
Our model suggests that the money market interest rate lies exactly on the policy
rate if, for example, n =1 /2 and βR → 1. It is reasonable to assume that n =1 /2
since it means that on average a bank is equally likely to borrow or to provide cash in
the money market and also equally likely to be either short of money or have excess
cash at the end of the day. The second assumption means that holding collateral has
21The ﬁrst two results exactly match the behavior of the overnight money market rate of the
c h a n n e ls y s t e mo p e r a t e db yt h eR e s e r v eB a n ko fN e wZ e a l a n d .T h i sc a nb es e e nf r o mF i g u r e2i n
the introduction.
25no cost. Third, as mentioned in the introduction, the Euro money market rate tends
to be above the minimum bid rate ip.22 Our model has a simple explanation for this
observation. With n =1 /2 and βR < 1,w eh a v eim =
i (2−βR)+idβR
2 >i p.T h u s ,
costly collateral generates a money market rate that tends to be above the target
rate.
Inﬂation To see the implications of our model for inﬂation, π ≡ γ − 1,23 we can
r e w r i t e( 4 0 )a sf o l l o w s
π =( 1+im)/R − 1.
By deﬁning r ≡ R − 1, we get the standard expression for the Fisher equation
(1 + r)(1+π)=1+im. It is interesting to note that the nominal interest rate
of the Fisher equation is the money market rate im and not i  or id.U s i n g( 4 6 ) ,w e
can rewrite the Fisher equation as follows:
π =( 1+i )/R − nβδ − 1. (47)
From this expression, it is clear that inﬂation is increasing in i  and id. If we keep
the spread δ constant, and shift the corridor up, inﬂation is also increasing. Finally,
inﬂation is also increasing if we increase the spread δ symmetrically around the policy
rate when n<1/(2βR). A sw eh a v ea r g u e da b o v e ,t h i sc o n d i t i o ni sl i k e l yt ob e
fulﬁlled since on average n =1 /2, which implies that the inequality reduces to βR < 1.
Liquidity We can interpret n as a measure for liquidity in the money market. If
n =1 /2, as mentioned above, banks are equally likely to have excess money or too
little money at the end of the day. If n<1/2, a bank is more likely to be short
of money at the end of the day. The implications of changes in n for the money
market rate, can again be explored by considering (44). From this equation it is clear
that an increase in liquidity (i.e., an increase in n) reduces the money market rate.
Furthermore, the choice of n aﬀects how close the money market rate is to the policy
rate.
22The European Central Bank does not consider the minimum bid rate to be its target rate.
Nevertheless, the minimum bid rate is in the middle of the corridor and, therefore, equal to ip = i +id
2 .
23Since we study steady state allocations, money growth and inﬂation are perfectly correlated.
Then, through the Fisher equation, long-run money growth and interest rates are positively corre-
lated, as conﬁrmed by the data (see McCandless and Weber 1995).
26Collateral requirement In the introduction, we have asked the question what the
optimal collateral requirement is? Inspection of (46) reveals that a higher return on
collateral, R, reduces the money market rate. From (47), one can also see that an
increase in R, reduces inﬂation, and, as discussed above, gets the money market rate
closer to the target rate. But the most important aspect of the collateral requirement
is that it aﬀects the real allocation. Inspection of (45) reveals that an increase in R
yields higher consumption, and, consequently, higher welfare.
Interest-rate rules Finally, a central bank can tighten its policy without changing
its policy rate by simply increasing the corridor symmetrically around the policy rate.






2ip − i 
.
It is evident that ∂∆/∂i  > 0. Hence, from (45), a symmetric increase of the spread
around the policy rate decreases consumption.
There is an important implication from this result. In a channel system, interest-
rate rules (i.e., rules that specify a path for the policy rate ip) are meaningless. The
reason is that such a rule does not determine whether a policy is “tight” or “loose.”
Rather, in a channel system, any policy must be characterized through an interest-rate
corridor rule.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed the theoretical properties of a channel system of interest-rate con-
trol in a dynamic general equilibrium model with inﬁnitely-lived agents and a central
bank. With this model, we could match several stylized facts regarding the use of
channel systems by central banks. Moreover, we could derive several policy implica-
tions that we have summarized in Section 5. Perhaps, the most important result is
that interest-rate rules are meaningless in a channel system. In a channel system, any
policy must be characterized through an interest-rate corridor rule. This is a new
insight, which goes beyond what we already know from the large and growing body
of literature on the optimal design of interest-rate rules.
27While our paper is a ﬁrst step towards analyzing monetary policy implementation
in a channel system, many aspects have remained unexplored. Moreover, many ele-
ments of real life channel systems are still not very well understood. An indication
for this is that many central banks are still experimenting with the optimal design.
A point in case is the channel system operated by the Bank of England, that we
discuss in the Appendix. One puzzle, for example, is why there is so little volatility
in the money-market interest rate in case of New Zealand (see Figure 2) and so much
in the cases of England (see Figure 4) and the European Central Bank (Figure 1).
What is the role of reserve requirements and should the central bank pay interest
on them? Furthermore, we know little about optimal monetary policy in a channel
system under stress and aggregate shocks. These are issues left for future research.
287 APPENDIX
7.1 Background24
To understand some of the features of our environment, it is useful to have some
information on how the money market functions and on monetary policy procedures
at central banks that operate a standing facility. This section does not aim at being
general, and we will, therefore, concentrate on the case of the euro money markets
and the ECB’s operating procedures.
Operating procedures of the ECB The ECB has two main instruments for the
implementation of its monetary policy. First, it conducts weekly main reﬁnancing
operations that are collateralized loans with a one-week maturity. Main reﬁnancing
operations are implemented using a liquidity auction, where banks bid for liquidity.
Bids consist of an amount of liquidity and an interest rate. The total amount to be
allocated is announced before the auction. Following the auction, the ECB allocates
liquidity according to the bidded rates, in a descending order. The minimum bid rate
is the main policy rate used by the ECB to implement monetary policy.
Second, the ECB oﬀers a standing facility with a lending rate that is 100 basis
points higher than its minimum bid rate, and a deposit rate that is 100 basis points
below its minimum bid rate. At the lending facility, liquidity is provided either in the
form of overnight repurchase agreements or as overnight collateralized loans, whereby
the ownership of the asset is retained by the debtor. In both cases, banks have to
resort to safe, eligible assets as deﬁned by the ECB. Eligible banks can access the
standing facilities at any time of the day. The use of the standing facility largely
depends on banks’ activities on the euro money markets during the day.
The euro money markets There are two segments for the euro money market.
The ﬁrst segment is the unsecured money market, where banks borrow and lend
cash to each other without resorting to collateral. The reference interest rate on the
unsecured money market is the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA), calculated
24This section draws heavily on materials from ECB (2005), ECB (2004), BIS (2003) and Hart-
mann, Manna and Manzanares (2001).
29by the ECB. The second segment is the secured money market where agents lend
at diﬀerent maturities against collateral. This is the largest money market segment.
There are several reference interest rates, depending on maturities (Euro Interbank
Oﬀered Rates, or Euribors) and on whether the collateral pledged belong to a general
collateral pool (Euripo).
Transactions on both segments of the money market are settled using the two
large-value payment systems operating in the euro area, the Trans-European Auto-
mated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and Euro1.
These large value payment systems are essential in ﬁnalizing the transfer of funds
for transactions taking place in money markets. Therefore, the opening and closing
hours of money markets are closely related to the operating hours of these payment
systems.
TARGET settles payments with immediate ﬁnality in central bank money and
operates between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. C.E.T. with a cut-oﬀ time of 5 p.m. for customer
payments.25 Eligible institutions hold accounts at TARGET, which are debited or
credited depending on market participants’ orders. Intraday credit is provided free
of charge as long as it is fully collateralized. Banks may also access the deposit or
lending facilities after making a request at the latest 30 minutes after the actual
closing time of TARGET.26 After the close of TARGET, an overdraft position on a
bank’s TARGET account is automatically transformed into an overnight loan via a
recourse to the lending facility, again against eligible assets.
Euro1 is a private, large-value payment systems oﬀered by the Euro Banking
Association (EBA). Euro1 functions as a sort of netting system, whereby on each
settlement day, at any given time, each participant will have only one single payment
obligation or claim with respect to the community of other participants as joint cred-
itors/debtors. In particular, there are no bilateral payments, claims or obligations
between participants. Euro1 settles in central bank money at the ECB at the end of
t h ed a y .A f t e rt h ec u t - o ﬀ time of 4 p.m. C.E.T., clearing banks with debit positions
will pay their single obligations into the EBA settlement account at the ECB through
TARGET. After all amounts due have been received, the ECB will pay the clearing
25The unsecured segment opens around 8 a.m. in the morning and closes around 5:45 p.m.
26On the last Eurosystem business day of a minimum reserve maintenance period, the deposit
facility can be accessed for 60 minutes after the actual closing of TARGET.
30banks with credit positions also using TARGET.
In this paper, we will model two speciﬁc features of the description above. First,
banks cannot carry overnight overdrafts on their TARGET accounts, and they have
to borrow either on the money markets or at the lending facility in order to cover their
TARGET positions. When TARGET closes, euro money markets are also closed. As
a consequence, the central bank standing facility is, at the end of the day, the only
recourse to overnight liquidity. Also, since participants can access the standing facility
30 minutes after the close of target, any late payments received on a TARGET account
can be deposited at the standing facility of the ECB. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r ,w e
model this aspect of the liquidity management problem. Second, banks can predict
when a payment is due or incoming so that, with a well-functioning money market,
the likelihood to resort to the standing facilities should be small. However, there
may be unexpected payments to be made that can force banks to hold an overdraft
on their TARGET account. In the second part of the paper, we adjunct a money
market to the model. There, banks will be able to trade their liquidity when they are
conﬁdent that they will end up the day with a credit on their central bank account.
Given it is the most important segment of the money market, we concentrate on the
secured interbank money market.
7.2 Channel system of the Bank of England
Here, we discuss the channel system operated by the Bank of England. As shown in
Figure 4, the Sterling Overnight Interbank Average rate (SONIA) was very volatile
until the ﬁrst quarter of 2006. Before this date the Bank’s implementation framework
consisted of a 100-basis-point corridor, non-remunerated daily reserves requirements
and a somewhat restricted access to the borrowing facility27 From January 2000 to
May 2006, the SONIA was on average 5 basis points below the Bank of England
target rate, while the daily gilt repo rate with two-week maturity was on average
11 basis points below the target rate over the same period. Furthermore, the Bank
decreased its target rate from 4% to 3.75% in February 2003. However, the SONIA
averaged 3.95% over the period when the Bank rate was 4%, and averaged 3.76%
27For details on the Bank of England implementation framework, we refer the reader to Bank of
England (2004) and Clews (2005).
31after its easing. Hence, while monetary policy targeted a 25-basis-points easing, the






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: The channel system of the Bank of England
Source: European Banking Federation and ECB
Hence, the implementation framework was not very eﬃcient in implementing mon-
etary policy. As a result of this ineﬃciency, the Bank of England reformed its im-
plementation framework in 2006. It introduced 1) a 25-basis-point corridor on the
last day of the maintenance period, 2) remuneration on reserves within limits at the
oﬃc i a lb a n kr a t ea n d3 )o p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n st oe n s u r et h a tt h e r ei sa ne q u a l( a n d
small) chance of using either facility. As Figure 4 illustrates, this reform resulted in
an immediate decrease in the variability of the SONIA and repo rates. Furthermore,
the SONIA is now on average 5 basis points above the Bank’s target rate and more
surprisingly, the repo rate is also on average 5 basis points above the target rate.
Therefore, the reform of the monetary implementation framework increased the aver-
age diﬀerence between the Bank’s target rate and the SONIA by 10 basis points and
the diﬀerence between the repo rate and the Bank’s target rate by 16 basis points.
327.3 Welfare
In this Appendix, we show that, if the central bank’s objective is to maximize the
expected discounted utility of the representative agent, the central bank’s objective
is to maximize (2). To derive (2), we must ﬁrst calculate hours worked in market 1.
The money holdings at the opening of the ﬁr s tm a r k e ta r e˜ m =0 ,h a v i n gb o u g h t ,
and ˜ m = m + pqs, having sold. Hence, hours worked are
hb = φ[m+1 +( 1+i ) ] − (R − 1)b − πM
hs = φ[m+1 − (1 + id)(m + pqs)] − (R − 1)b − πM.
Since h = nhs +( 1− n)hb, by using (1) and rearranging we get
h = −(R − 1)b +( 1− n)φ  − nφ(m + pqs)+φm
= −(R − 1)b +( 1− n)φ  +( 1− n)φm − nφpqs
= −(R − 1)b
since pq = m +   and qs = 1−n
n q. Then, welfare is given by




j {(1 − n)[u(q) − q]+( R − 1)b}
=




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . For ease of exposition, we assume π =0 . The proof can
be easily replicated when π>0.W eﬁrst prove the only if part. Assume ﬁrst z  =0




0(q) − 1] (48)
and from (17) we have
1 − Rβ
Rβ
≥ (1 − n)[u
0(q)/∆ − 1]. (49)
Use (49) to replace u0(q) in (48) and rearrange to get ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.
33Assume now that z  > 0 and zm > 0.T h e nf r o m( 1 9 )z  > 0 implies that 1+id >γ .
U s e( 1 8 )t or e p l a c eγ and rearrange to get ∆ < ˜ ∆.N e x td i v i d e( 1 9 )b y1+id and







since 1+id >γ .H e n c e ,w eh a v e1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆,i fz  > 0 and zm > 0.
Finally, assume that z  > 0 and zm =0 . Then, the previous equation immediately
implies that ∆ =1 .
We now prove the if part. From (18) and (19) we get
1 − nβ − β (1 − n)u











≥ β (1 − n)u
0(q) (51)
Assume ﬁrst that 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆. Use (50) to rewrite (51) as follows











0 < ˜ ∆ − ∆ ≤





Hence, 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆ implies
z 
zm > 0.
Assume next that ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆.T h e nf r o m( 5 0 )w eh a v e
1 − nβ − β (1 − n)u
0(q) ≥ (1 − n)
³




Then z  > 0 immediately implies that
0 > ˜ ∆ − ∆ ≥
(1 − n)
³





which is a contradiction. Hence ∆ ≥ ˜ ∆ implies z  =0 .
Existence and uniqueness when ˜ ∆ ≤ ∆: In this case z  = b =0and from
(19) γ =1+id. Then, from (18) and (19) we get (48). Since the right-hand side of
(48) is strictly decreasing in q, there exists a unique q that solves (48). Finally, from
(20) we have zm = q.
34Existence and uniqueness when 1 < ∆ < ˜ ∆: The system of equations (17)-
(20) with z  = βRb/∆ can be reduced as follows. Equations (20) and z  = βRb/∆
imply zm = q − βRb/∆. Then, multiply both sides of (19) by zm and replace zm to
get
(q − βRb/∆)[γ − (1 + id)] = −(1 − n)z (i  − id).
Use (18) to eliminate γ and rearrange to get
(q − βRb/∆){1 − (1 − n)β[u
0(q) − 1] − β} =( 1− n)
βRb
(1 + i )
(i  − id).





(q − βRb/∆){1 − (1 − n)β[u
0(q) − 1] − β} =( 1− n)
βRb
(1 + i )
(i  − id)










0 [βRbF(∆)]/∆ + n ≡ RHS. (52)
The left-hand side of (52) is constant while the right-hand side is decreasing in b for
ag i v e n1 ≤ ∆ < ˜ ∆. Moreover, we have limb→0 RHS =+ ∞ and limb→∞RHS = n<
1
Rβ. Hence, for any policy ∆ with 1 ≤ ∆ < ˜ ∆, a unique b>0 exists. Then, from (24)
a unique value for q exists. Accordingly, a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium
exists.
Finally, we have lim∆→˜ ∆ F(∆)=+ ∞ and so b → 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . We ﬁrst show that π =0is optimal. Note that ˆ q is
independent of π,a n d˜ q is decreasing in π. Therefore, increasing π does only decrease
the lower bound of the set of attainable allocations. Second, F(∆;π) is decreasing
in π,s ot h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nπ either increases b, decrease q,o rb o t h . T h i sr e d u c e s
welfare. Hence, since π ≥ 0,i ti so p t i m a lt os e tπ to zero.
35We now assume π =0 . Substituting (25) into the objective function, the problem
becomes
max







s.t. ˆ q ≥ q ≥ ˜ q.
After rearranging, the ﬁrst-order condition is
(1 − n)[u










= ˆ λ − ˜ λ
where ˆ λ is the multiplier of the ﬁrst inequality, and ˜ λ is the multiplier of the second
inequality. Consider the ﬁrst-order condition and note that
∆(q)=
Rβ (1 − n)u0 (q)
1 − nRβ
.
Suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ =1 ; i.e., q =ˆ q. In this case, ˜ λ =0and










which is a contradiction. Thus, in any equilibrium q<ˆ q,i m p l y i n g∆ > 1.
Now suppose that the optimal q is such that ∆ = ˜ ∆; i.e., q =˜ q. In this case,
˜ λ>0 and ˆ λ =0 , implying that Θ(˜ q,R) < 0. One can show that lim∆→˜ ∆ F (∆)=∞,
lim∆→˜ ∆ F0 (∆)=∞, lim∆→˜ ∆
F0(∆)∆





Moreover, (1 − n)[u0(q) − 1] = 1/β − 1. Accordingly, we get





(R − 1)(1 − n)
u00 (˜ q)˜ q
u0 (˜ q)
Consider ﬁrst R → 1.T h e nw eh a v elimR→1 Θ(˜ q,R)=−∞. Now consider R → 1/β.









=0 .T h u s ,i f
R<R, q =˜ q and if R>R, q solves Θ(q,R)=0 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . A stationary equilibrium requires that M+1/M = φ/φ+1 = γ.
To prove Lemma 4, note ﬁr s tt h a tu s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tλ
k





  +i  and λ
k
d = id, the marginal value of money, the marginal value of collateral
and the marginal value of private debt in market 3 c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s
V
k



































To derive (40) rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition (27) by using equations (9), (32),













































Finally, combine (56) with (57) to get (40).
To derive (41), note that in any equilibrium, the budget constraints in the goods
market hold with equality and so
pq
k = m
k +  
k = M + y
k +  
k,k = H,L.( 5 8 )
Then, use (58) to substitute yH and yL in the money market’s market clearing con-
dition (34) and rearrange to get (41).
To derive (42) combine (34) and (58).
Finally, to derive (43) use (40) to write (39) as follows
Rˆ ∆ − ∆








Then, use (58) to substitute  H and  L and rearrange to get
Rˆ ∆−∆
Rˆ ∆(∆−1) = −(1 − n)+ 1
zm
£
σL(1 − nL)qL + σH(1 − nH)qH − σL(nH − nL)zL¤
.
Finally use (42) and solve for zm to get (42).
Note that equations (56) - (43) must hold in any monetary equilibrium, where
agents hold collateral. We now consider the case where no short-selling constraint is
binding in the money market to derive (44) and (45).




m  =0 ,
and so from (29) V L
m + V L
y = V H
m + V H






(∆ − ˆ ∆)
(ˆ ∆ − 1)
,k = H,L.
Using these expressions to replace u0(qH) and u0(qL) in (56) and solving for ˆ ∆ yields
(44). Finally, to derive (45) use (44) to replace ˆ ∆ in the above equations.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . The ﬁrst thing to note is that the system of equations
(40) - (45) can be solved recursively as described in the text. It remains to show under
which conditions the short-selling constraints in the money market are non-binding.
Thus, we need to verify that yk <R b /
£
φ+1 (1 + im)
¤
and that m + yk > 0.U s i n g
the seller’s ﬁrst-order condition and dividing by p,w ec a nw r i t et h e s ec o n d i t i o n sa s
follows
z
k <β R bˆ ∆/∆ and zm + z
k > 0.
Since zL >z H,i ti ss u ﬃcient to check that zL <β R b ˆ ∆/∆. A l o n gt h es a m el i n e s ,
since zL >z H,i ti ss u ﬃcient to check that zH > −zm.
Let us ﬁrst consider whether zH > −zm.F r o m( 4 2 )a n d( 4 3 )zH > −zm if
σL¡
qL − qH¢




Rˆ ∆ − ∆
´
/[R(∆ − 1)] + (1 − n) ˆ ∆.N o t e t h a t Φ > (1 − n) ˆ ∆ since
Rˆ ∆ > ∆.
Then nH −nL = ε and σLnL +σHnH = n yield nH = n+σLε and nL = n−σHε.
Using these relations and rearranging yields


















< Φ + σH
σL
³
ˆ ∆ − 1
´
(1 − n)+εσH.
The left-hand side is larger than zero since Φ > (1 − n) ˆ ∆. Moreover, it is strictly
smaller than the right-hand side at ε =0(since qL = qH at ε =0 ). Then, divide the
inequality by
h
Φ − (1 − n)
³










38T h el e f th a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nε and the right-hand side is decreasing. Therefore,
there is a unique ˜ ε1, such that zH > −zm when ε<˜ ε1.
We next check βRbˆ ∆/∆ >z L.F r o mσHqH + σLqL = zm +
βRb
∆ ,w en e e dσHqH +
σLqL >z m + zL/ˆ ∆, or replacing for zm and zL, and rearranging we need
σHqH + σLqL >






ˆ ∆ − 1
´
and arrange to obtain
¡
σHqH + σLqL¢ ˆ ∆ − qL >
ˆ ∆{(ˆ ∆−1)[σL(1−nL)qL+σH(1−nH)qH]−(nH−nL)σLσH(qL−qH)ˆ ∆}
Φ .


























This expression is satisﬁed at ε =0s i n c ew eh a v eΦ > (1−n)ˆ ∆. Dividing both sides






 < Φ −
³













qL is decreasing in ε, the left-hand side is increasing in ε,a n dt h er i g h t - h a n d
side is also increasing in ε. Therefore, given this constraint does not bind at ε =0 ,
either it never binds or it binds for some ε>´ ε1.T h u s , i f ε<ε 1 =m i n {˜ ε1,´ ε1},a
unique equilibrium exists where no short-selling constraint binds.
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